

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE ¹
ACQUISITION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION FROM
US GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS AND OFFICIALS WITHIN
THE UNITED STATES

(Effective 24 November 1982)

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, Executive Order 12333, and as directed by the National Security Council, policies and procedures are herewith established to ensure the effective utilization within the United States of U.S. Government organizations and officials for the acquisition of foreign intelligence information.

1. Purpose

The Central Intelligence Agency is designated to administer, as a service of common concern on behalf of the Intelligence Community, the task of acquiring foreign intelligence information from selected U.S. Government officials, normally stationed in the United States, who may possess foreign intelligence potential as the result of (a) official or private travel abroad, (b) participation in international events of intelligence significance, or (c) direct or indirect contact with foreign organizations and persons who possess information of intelligence value.

2. Policy

- a. The assistance of U.S. Government officials possessing the intelligence potential described above shall be enlisted on a selective basis in accordance with the needs, interests, and capabilities of the Intelligence Community organizations, individually and collectively.
- b. The contact and interview of U.S. Government officials shall be planned and coordinated among Intelligence Community organizations to (1) provide the maximum possible intelligence coverage, (2) minimize undesirable duplication of effort, and (3) ensure the systematic dissemination of the resulting intelligence information.
- c. The sources contacted and methods employed under this directive shall be protected from unauthorized disclosure, and due cognizance shall be taken of potential risks to U.S. interests.

3. Responsibilities and Procedures

- a. The Central Intelligence Agency will coordinate, and have the primary responsibility for, the development and utilization of the foreign intelligence potential of government organizations and their officials which do not have representation in the Intelligence Community. By virtue of special association, however, there may be cases in which other Intelligence Community organizations will have specific interest in a particular source, and therefore depart from this provision, upon consultation with the CIA.

¹ This directive supersedes DCID No. 2/8, 18 May 1976.

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- b. Each Intelligence Community organization shall develop and utilize the foreign intelligence potential of its own officials for its own needs and is encouraged to do so to meet Community needs as well. If an Intelligence Community organization elects not to utilize its source on behalf of the Community and authorizes Community participation, responsibility for coordinating the effort shall rest with the Central Intelligence Agency.
- c. In support of these functions, Intelligence Community organizations shall exchange timely information about the prospective departure from, return to, or availability within the United States of officials having a significant foreign intelligence potential, and whose utilization they wish to authorize on a Community basis. The Central Intelligence Agency will undertake to obtain comparable information from organizations which are not a part of the Community and shall circulate such information as may be made available to it.
- d. The Intelligence Community organization working with a source on a Community basis shall solicit briefing and debriefing requirements, arrange appropriate participation in briefings and debriefings, and assume responsibility for jointly developing a plan that will best serve the overall Community needs, including arrangements for the publication and dissemination of the resulting product, subject to the concurrence of the parent organization of the source.
4. Further to implement this program, representatives of participating Intelligence Community organizations may assign to duty in CIA [redacted] headquarters, by mutual agreement and within their capabilities, representatives to serve their interest in this domestic program under the direction of the appropriate CIA official. Such organizations may also, at their discretion, establish active working liaison between their field elements and CIA [redacted]
5. Nothing in this directive shall be interpreted to affect the established relationships of the Intelligence Community organizations with departments and agencies which are not a part of the Community for purposes other than those covered by this directive.

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William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence